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CHAPTER 2  
REGULATORY CRIME 
Eimear Spain and Shane Kilcommins 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In examining the contours of criminal law and its application, most lawyers and 
criminologists are drawn to traditional ‘real crime’ (homicides, violent assaults, 
organised crime, sexual offences, requirements of mens rea and actus reus, and 
general defences) whilst ignoring white collar offences which are often enforced by 
specialist agencies. As a society we have tended to be preoccupied with the ‘punitive 
regulation of the poor’, a project closely tied to a police-prisons way of knowing that 
focuses on ‘crime in the streets’ rather than ‘crime in the suites’ (see J Braithwaite 
(2003) and ‘What’s Wrong with the Sociology of Punishment’ 7(1) Theo. Crim. 5-28 
at 7). The narrow exclusivity of this approach is a mistake, not least because 
criminalisation is now more than ever viewed as a panacea for almost any social 
problem. More and more Irish society is witnessing the increasing and extensive use 
of regulatory strategies by the Irish state. In areas such as competition law, 
environmental protection, health and safety law, and consumer and corporate affairs, 
there has been a move towards using criminalisation as the last-resort strategy when 
compliance through negotiation and monitoring has failed.  
Distinctions have traditionally been drawn between regulatory crimes and ordinary 
crimes on the basis that the former are mala prohibita (prohibited wrongs) and the 
latter are mala in se (moral wrongs). Regulatory crimes, it was suggested, should be 
thought of in ‘instrumental means-ends terms’, as not embodying quasi-moral values 
such as ‘justice, fairness, right, and wrong’ (see N Lacey ‘Criminalisation as 
Regulation: the role of the criminal law’ in C Parker et al, eds, Regulating Law 
Oxford: OUP, 2004, p. 145). Regulatory crimes were viewed as ‘quasi administrative 
matters’ that did not attract significant moral opprobrium or stigmatise those 
convicted (see F McAuley and P McCutcheon, Criminal Liability, Dublin: Round 
Hall, 2000, p. 341). It has also been argued that regulatory crimes are more likely to 
be victimless (or at least not have a readily identifiable victim). Furthermore, and as 
noted above, it is suggested that regulatory offences for the most part do not embody a 
punitive or sanctioning model of justice, preferring instead to favour compliance 
strategies.  
2.2 The definition and causes of white collar crime 
Edwin Sutherland is reported to be the pioneer of white collar criminology. He 
suggested that white collar crime was ‘a crime committed by a person of 
respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation’ (see White Collar 
Crime New York: Dryden Press, 1949, p. 9), thus challenging the stereotypical 
assumptions about all crime being committed by the lower classes. He went on to note 
that the ‘…financial cost of white collar crime is probably several times as great as 
the financial cost of all the crimes which are customarily regarded as the ‘crime 
problem…’ (‘White Collar Criminality’ 1940 5(1) Am. Sociol. Rev. 1-12 at 5). More 
significantly, Sutherland also emphasised the impact of such crime on society:  ‘The 
financial loss from white collar crime, great as it is, is less important than the damage 
to social relations. White-collar crimes violate trust and therefore create distrust, 
which lowers social morale and produces social disorganisation on a large scale. 
Other crimes produce relatively little effect on social institutions or social 
organisation.’ (ibid, at 5).  
A key point for Sutherland was to emphasise the idea that white collar criminality was 
real criminality. It may not feature in debates about the crime problem or on the law 
and order agenda, but this was a mere labelling matter: ‘…white collar criminality 
differs from lower class criminality principally in an implementation of the criminal 
law which segregates white-collar criminals administratively from other criminals…’ 
(ibid, at 11-12). The fact that it is not ordinarily called crime is facilitated by a degree 
of remoteness as it is far removed from one’s immediate experience. If an individual 
overpays for goods because of price fixing, or is overcharged by banks, there is not a 
perception that he or she is marked out specifically as a crime victim. If however the 
same individual was robbed on the street of this money, the perception of what 
occurred, and the label that would attach, would be different.  
Defining white collar crime is problematic. As Sutherland suggested, it is ‘a crime 
committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his 
occupation’. There are a number of elements to this definition.  
a) It is ‘a crime’: This is an obvious element but it is often forgotten.  
b) It is ‘committed by persons of respectability’ i.e. someone with no convictions 
for non-white collar crime. But should this category not also include 
corporations where they engage in criminal wrongdoing? For example, the 
Law Reform Commission recommended in 2005 that a corporation should be 
liable for manslaughter if the prosecution proves that it was grossly negligent 
in a way which caused death (see LRC, Report on Corporate Killing (LRC 77-
2005)).  
c) It is committed by ‘individuals of high social status’. This is a problematic 
statement e.g. environmental offences are not always committed by persons of 
high social status.  
d) It is committed in the ‘course of his/her occupation’. This categorisation 
relates to offences such as price fixing, overcharging, false accounting, 
charging for unnecessary work, pilfering, bribery, money laundering, misuse 
of computers, telephone, photocopier, time fiddling, insider trading, amongst 
other such wrongs. Sutherland’s definition is not all-encompassing as it does 
not include similar wrongs not made in the course of employment e.g. tax 
evasion or false claims made against insurance companies.  
Suggested additional elements to the definition of white collar crime to join 
Sutherland’s four elements might be ‘a violation of trust’ (see K. Williams, 
Criminology Oxford: OUP, 2001, 64) and the ‘organisational’ or ‘economic’ 
attributes of white collar crime.  
It is clear, therefore, that considerable disagreement exists about the range of 
misconduct that would fall within the definition. In order to avoid the straight-
jacket of overly prescriptive accounts, some commentators have accordingly 
attempted to develop typologies of the forms of crime that may fit under the 
general penumbra of white collar crime. These include: financial offences (from 
share dealing to bribery to tax evasion); offences against consumers (price fixing, 
illegal sales, unfit goods);crimes against employees; and crimes against the 
environment. (See S. Tombs, ‘Corporate Crime’ in C Hale et al, eds Criminology, 
Oxford: OUP 267-287 at 269). 
If there are tensions in relation to the definition of white collar crime, it is also the 
case that there is no settled agreement on causation. Whilst there is consensus that 
theories of crime that focus on poverty or poor socialisation cannot account for the 
phenomenon of white collar crime, no criminological approach has emerged to 
dominate the landscape. Instead, a variety of approaches can be employed, the merits 
of which may vary depending on ideological standpoint or the circumstances of 
individual cases. To begin with, one can refer to ‘classicism or rational choice theory’. 
This approach presupposes that crime is based on calculative reasoning, in which the 
actor coldly weighs up the perceived benefits and ranges them against the expected 
costs (likelihood and consequences of detection). As Charles Murray, for example, 
notes: ‘…offenders are extremely pragmatic. Their calculations seemed to be based 
on a hard headed appreciation of the facts’ (see ‘The Physical Environment and 
Community Control of Crime’ in J Wilson, ed, Crime and Public Policy San 
Francisco: ICS Press, 1983, p. 115). Similarly Richard Posner would suggest that:  
‘…a criminal is someone who has chosen to engage in criminal activity 
because the expected utility of such activity to him, net of expected costs, 
is greater than that of any legitimate alternative activity. His calculation of 
advantages can be altered by changing any of a number of factors and the 
severity of the punishment, in the event punishment is imposed, in turn 
affects the expected cost of punishment’ (Economic Analysis of Law 
Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1972, p. 365). 
Weak regulation or non-enforcement therefore provides a fertile ground for white 
collar criminality.  
Some criminologists would suggest that white collar crime can be explained by 
‘differential association’ i.e. criminal behaviour is learnt behaviour. If an individual is 
in an environment where there is a surplus of favourable dispositions to law violation 
over unfavourable dispositions, this may contribute to his or her involvement in 
crime. This learning, and exposure to different definitions regarding the 
appropriateness or otherwise of certain behaviours, emerges out of our various 
associations. These associations vary by frequency, duration (a lot of time spent in the 
workforce), priority (loyalty to the firm), and intensity (‘everyone in the trade is doing 
it’). As Edwin Sutherland notes: ‘white collar criminality, just as other systematic 
criminality, is learned; that it is learned in direct or indirect association with those 
who already practice the behaviour; and that those who learn this criminal behaviour 
are segregated from frequent and intimate contacts with law-abiding behaviour. 
Whether a person becomes a criminal or not is determined largely by the comparative 
frequency and intimacy of his contacts with the two types of behaviour. This may be 
called the process of differential association’ (see ‘White Collar Criminality’ 5(1) 
Am. Sociol. Rev. 1-12 at 10-11). Two criminologists, Gresham Sykes and David 
Matza, argue that criminals also learn ‘techniques’ that enable them to ‘weaken’ the 
hold society places over them, and to justify their wrongdoing. These techniques act 
as defence mechanisms that discharge the wrongdoer from the constraints associated 
with moral order. This is particularly true of white collar offenders who are likely to 
perceive themselves as conventional law-abiding citizens and not typecast criminals. 
There are five such techniques: denial of responsibility e.g. I was following corporate 
orders; denial of injury e.g. I did not cause any harm; denial of the victim e.g. there is 
no real victim; condemnation of the condemners e.g. they are all at it; appeal to higher 
loyalties e.g. the company depends on me, what was I going to do? (see (‘Techniques 
of Neutralisation: a theory of delinquency’ Am. Sociol. Rev. 22 (1957) 664-670). 
Some also support the view that white collar crime is caused by ‘strain’. Structurally 
induced strain in society is created through an emphasis on economic success, the 
pursuit of individual self-interest, competitiveness, and materialism. In the world of 
business, the pressure to win market share, exceed targets and increase profits are 
compelling inducements. White collar crime can thus be seen as an innovative 
response on the part of businesses when individuals and institutions are unable to 
achieve their goals through legitimate channels. In these circumstances, and aware of 
the disjunction between institutionalised aspirations (pressures to maximise profit, 
growth, efficiency) and the availability of legitimate opportunities, white collar 
criminals will ‘innovate’ in order to achieve institutional goals. As Robert Merton 
notes, ‘…on the top economic levels, the pressure towards innovation not infrequently 
erases the distinction between businesslike strivings this side of the mores and sharp 
practices beyond the mores…’ (see ‘Social Structure and Anomie’ 3 Am. Sociol. 
Rev.1938, 672-682 at 677). If the institution, or society, values and rewards the goal 
of achievement over the means by which it is attained, criminal acts may well be 
forgiven, understood as ‘being part of the business’. 
Finally, those who support ‘labelling or Marxist’ perspectives would draw attention to 
the fact that it is a mistake to see deviance simply as the infraction of some agreed 
rule (positivism). To do so is to ignore the fact that what constitutes crime is to some 
extent a product of the capacity of powerful groups to impose their definitions of 
crime on the behaviour of other groups. In other words, crime is not a pre-given, 
objective concept; rather it has an open texture, a negotiable and fluid status that 
allows it to be shaped to particular ends. As Howard Becker noted: ‘…[s]ocial groups 
create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by 
applying those rules to a particular people and labelling them as outsiders…’ (see The 
Outsiders, New York, Free Press, 1963, 9). In Ireland, Ciaran McCullagh has 
suggested:  
The law making process is the means through which the criminal label is distributed 
in society. As it operates in Ireland, the process of law making distributes this level in 
an uneven manner. It sanctions some kinds of socially harmful behaviour and ignores 
others. It is aided and abetted by an enforcement system that devotes more resources 
to the pursuit of some kinds of law-breaking than others… The end product of this 
system, is a criminal population which contains a disproportionate number of those 
who are poor, uneducated and unskilled. 
(See ‘Getting the Criminals We Want: the social production of the criminal 
population’ in P Clancy, ed, Irish Society: sociological perspectives, Dublin: IPA, 
1995 pp. 411-412). 
 
2.3 The failure to treat white collar crime seriously 
It has long been felt that the rich and powerful are relatively immunised from the full 
reach of criminal law. W.G Carson, for example, in examining white collar crime in 
factories in England in 1970 noted: ‘…The behaviour of persons of respectability and 
upper socio-economic class frequently exhibits all the essential attributes of crime but 
it is only very rarely dealt with as such. Systems of criminal justice favour certain 
economically and politically powerful groups and disfavour others, notably the poor 
and unskilled who comprise the bulk of the visible criminal population’ (see ‘White 
Collar Crime and the Enforcement of Factory Legislation’ 10(4) B.J.Crim. 1970, 383-
390 at 384). Similarly, the French philosopher Michel Foucault suggested: 
 …it would be hypocritical or naïve to believe that the law was made for all in 
the name of all; that it would be more prudent to recognise that it was made 
for the few and that it was brought to bear upon others; that in principle it 
applies to all citizens, but that it is addressed principally to the most numerous 
and least enlightened classes; that in the courts society as a whole does not 
judge one of its members, but that a social category with an interest in order 
judges another that is dedicated to disorder:  “Visit the places where people 
are judged, imprisoned or executed…One thing will strike you everywhere; 
everywhere you see two quite distinct classes of men, one of which always 
meets on the seats of accusers and judges, the other on the benches of the 
accused”…Law and justice do not hesitate to proclaim their necessary class 
dissymmetry. (See M Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1991, p. 276)  
For Foucault, then, criminality and penality were ‘…ways of handling illegalities, of 
laying down the limits of tolerance, of giving free rein to some, of putting pressure on 
others, of excluding a particular section’ (ibid, at 272). This made it possible to ‘leave 
in the shade’ certain crimes that do not follow the ‘police-prosecutions-prisons’ 
trajectory. The following vignettes are an indicator of the extent to which 
dissymmetry exists in Ireland in relation to perceptions of criminal wrongdoing: 
 
 A Mayo farmer who pleaded guilty to seven counts of making incorrect tax 
returns between 1991 and 1998 and who failed to declare an investment of 
almost €20,000 in an offshore account received a suspended prison sentence. 
The offender owned land worth more than €3 million, despite having declared 
an annual income of just £400 over a ten year period in the 1980s and 1990s. 
He held a number of bogus non-resident accounts and accounts in the names 
of deceased persons. The week before his case came to court he paid €316,000 
to the Revenue Commissioners. According to a newspaper report about the 
case, the criminal was described by his parish priest as a ‘good, decent, honest 
to goodness’ person who worked hard. The priest added that he had never seen 
the offender’s wife without Wellingtons on her when he called to the house. 
(See S Kilcommins et al, Crime, Punishment and the Search for Order in 
Ireland (Dublin, IPA, 2004), 132-133).  
 ‘Those who are tempted to make serious breaches of company law have little 
reason to fear detection and prosecution. As far as enforcement is concerned, 
the sound of the enforcer’s footsteps on the beat is simply never heard’. (See 
‘Working Group on Company Law Compliance and Enforcement’ 1998, para 
2.5). 
 The costs of crime investigated by the Revenue Commissioners far exceed the 
costs of street crime. The Whitaker Committee estimated that the losses 
incurred through white-collar crime in 1984 were more than ten times the 
value of all stolen property recorded by the Gardaí… The total value of 
property stolen in burglaries, larcenies and robberies in 2002 was €97 million. 
In the same year, seven times as much money was collected as a result of 
investigations into just three waves of illegal activity involving some of 
Ireland’s most influential citizen… the DIRT and bogus non-resident account 
investigation (over €600 million); unauthorised offshore investments sold by 
National Irish Bank (€43 million); and the Ansbacher deposits (€21 million) 
(S Kilcommins et al, Crime, Punishment and the Search for Order in Ireland 
Dublin, IPA, 2004,  at p. 131). 
 In a report on corruption in Ireland from 2006 to 2009, [Transparency 
International] concluded that there is very little of what it calls ‘petty’ 
corruption such as the bribing of officials…What it did find however is that 
‘Ireland is regarded by domestic and international observers as suffering high 
levels of legal corruption’. It defines this as situations where political policy 
and political decisions are ‘believed’ to be influenced by personal connections, 
patronage, political favours and donations to politicians and political parties. It 
sees the risks of corruption as high in relation to appointments to public 
bodies, a power in the control of individual ministers, in relation to the 
funding of political parties where ‘influence selling has yet to be outlawed’, 
where political lobbying is unregulated, where political parties do not have to 
publish accounts and where the public contracting system is open to 
‘significant abuse’. (See C McCullagh, ‘Two Tier Society; Two Tier Crime; 
Two Tier Justice’ in Kilcommins and Kilkelly, eds, Regulatory Crime in 
Ireland, 2010, 150). 
2.4 Should criminalisation and imprisonment be employed 
at all in relation to white collar crime? 
Some commentators in looking at white collar crime argue that, where possible, we 
should not use the full force of the criminal law, the implication being that a 
sanctioning approach to wrongdoing is inefficient and likely to dampen the 
entrepreneurial spirit. Instead compliance strategies should be employed to govern 
white collar wrongdoing. These compliance techniques involve persuasion and 
dialogue, facilitate good working relationships, thereby producing more efficient 
outcomes. For example, the Director of Public Prosecutions, James Hamilton, argues 
for the increased use of administrative sanctions. The advantage of employing such 
measures would be that the criminal law would not be cluttered up with provisions 
which did not ‘always carry the same moral stigma as convictions for the core 
criminal offences’ (J Hamilton, ‘Do we need a system of administrative sanctions in 
Ireland’ in Kilcommins and Kilkelly, eds, Regulatory Crime in Ireland (Dublin, First 
Law 2010, 15-2, at 17). Moreover, the current level of criminal penalties, particularly 
fines, do not adequately reflect the benefit to the wrongdoer, and therefore do not 
adequately deter. Finally, he suggests that running complex regulatory issues before 
lay juries is a difficult exercise (ibid at 21). One is reminded that the use of 
administrative penalties in Ireland does give rise to constitutional difficulties 
particularly having regard to Article 34 which deals with the exclusive authority of 
the courts in the administration of justice and Article 37 which prescribes the 
restriction of the determination of criminal matters to the courts. Professor Irene 
Lynch Fannon makes a similar point (see I Lynch Fannon, ‘Controlling Risk Taking: 
whose job is it anyway?’ in Kilcommins and Kilkelly, eds, Regulatory Crime in 
Ireland, Dublin: First Law, 2010, 113-127). She suggests that burden of proof in 
criminal cases makes it difficult to obtain prosecutions. Secondly, if criminal 
prosecutions are pursued, it will inevitably mean more litigation given that the 
individuals involved ‘will have the resources to test every legal argument’ (ibid, at 
115). There would also be an increased number of constitutional challenges. Finally, 
she notes ‘that there does not seem to be any great enthusiasm for incarceration as a 
means of dealing with white collar criminals’ (ibid, at 116). She goes on to suggest 
that ‘the possibility of imposing a more effective civil sanction which meets and 
regulates the behaviour at stake, instead of worrying about a less than effective 
criminal sanction following an expensive criminal trial is compelling’ (ibid, at 127). 
This echoes the sentiments of the Macrory report (R Macrory, Regulatory Justice, 
Making Sanctions Effective (Cameron, May, 2008) in the UK in 2008 where it was 
stated: ‘…[c]riminal prosecution may not be, in all circumstances, the most 
appropriate sanction to ensure that non-compliance is addressed, any damage is 
remedied or behaviour is changed. The availability of other more flexible and risk 
based tools may result in achieving better regulatory outcomes.’ 
Similarly, Professor Sandeep Gopalan, in a consultation session held in November 
2010 on white collar crime as part of the Department of Justice and Law Reform’s 
White Paper on Crime, warned against the over criminalisation of conduct which was 
traditionally dealt with by other areas of the law. He described the effects of the 
criminalisation of white collar crime in the following terms:  
‘…it undermines the coercive power of the criminal law, dilutes its expressive 
power, over-deters otherwise desirable business activities, conflates 
blameworthiness with imprisonment, creates incentives for prosecutors to 
abuse their powers, fuels an appetite for enhancing prison terms, increases 
social costs and punishes people for actions that in some instances are not 
even civil wrongs, let alone undertaken with the taint of moral wrongfulness.’  
He also alluded to the disproportionate burden of conviction on white-collar 
offenders. In particular he suggested that that if the cost of imprisonment is the same 
for offenders with different earning capacities, imprisoning those with very high 
earning capacities is a waste of social capital, especially if the objectives of 
incarceration can be achieved through other means.   
There is merit in these arguments. The line between poor business decision-making 
and criminal activity is far from clear cut. Moreover, white collar crime is hard to 
detect because it often occurs in private, behind closed corporate doors. It is also the 
case that proof is difficult in these cases, and often resource intensive. As was noted 
in the White Paper on Crime, Criminal Sanctions Discussion document, ‘…white 
collar offenders are more likely to have assets and to be in a position to pay fines, and 
to provide substantial economic restitution to their victims. From society’s 
perspective, this may be preferable to imposing a prison sentence’.  
Others like Shane Kilcommins and Barry Vaughan would suggest that whilst 
compliance and civil strategies should be accommodated where possible, one must 
also be committed to supporting criminal sanctioning strategies that send out the 
message to white collar criminals that their wrongdoing is treated seriously by society 
and will, if the circumstances warrant it, result in imprisonment like it does for street 
crimes (see S Kilcommins and B Vaughan, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory Irish State’ in  
Kilcommins and Kilkelly, eds, Regulatory Crime in Ireland, 2010, 90-91). To close 
off the possibility of imprisonment for white collar crime is a mistake for a number of 
reasons. To begin with our ordinary criminal justice system is founded on the notion 
that public protection and security are ‘essential goods’ that are necessary for our self-
preservation, well-being, and happiness. This is hardly contentious. Most people 
would agree that we need a system of justice that will enable us to flourish and go 
about our lives free from the threat of injury or harm e.g. robberies, rapes, assaults, 
burglaries, etc. What is striking, however, is that the perception stills exists in Ireland 
that white collar crime does not threaten our security in the same way that street crime 
does. This is a fallacy. Though it may appear more remote, more victimless and may 
often be less dramatic, misconduct in the banking and corporate sectors, in the 
workplace, in the environment, in the political arena and in the distortion of 
competition in the market poses as much, if not more, of a threat to our everyday lives 
as ordinary crime, with the potential to affect more people. Our security can be 
affected in a myriad of different ways by misconduct of this nature including, among 
other things, workplace injuries, loss of equal opportunity, loss of competition, loss of 
jobs, loss of reputation and the consequent devaluation of share prices and pension 
funds, threats to the environment, increased taxation, and increased costs for 
consumers. To-date, our society has adopted a very narrow understanding of what 
constitutes a threat to our security, fastened to a very traditional outlook that views 
white collar wrongdoing as having rather benign effects. The development of a more 
nuanced understanding that jettisons such traditional thinking is of paramount 
importance. Jurgen Habermas, in a book entitled Between Facts and Norms 
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 2008 repr), noted that our legal system needs to move away 
from ‘personal references and towards system relations’. These include: ‘protection 
from environmental destruction, protection from radiation poisoning or lethal genetic 
damage; and, in general, protection from the uncontrolled side effects of large 
technological operations, pharmaceutical products, scientific experimentation, and so 
forth (ibid 432-435)’. 
Once the seriousness of white collar wrongdoing is recognised, then one must also 
recognise that compliance strategies alone cannot best guarantee security for society. 
A compliance model of justice (negotiation, persuasion, etc.) speaks primarily to the 
‘good man’ who seeks to act in good faith and employs the law as a normative guide 
to conduct and action, and not to the ‘bad man’ who seeks to evade the strictures of 
the law. In Ireland, and as regards white collar wrongdoing, we seem to have operated 
for the most part along the dimension of persuading, never punishing (even though the 
necessary criminal sanctioning tools are in place). In order to encapsulate both forms 
of conduct, the compliance model must also be supported by a sanctioning model that 
includes the use of imprisonment. To suggest otherwise would be to endorse a two-
tier system of justice, something which would make a mockery of the notion of 
equality for all citizens before the law. If we accept the potential deterrent possibilities 
of imprisoning offenders for ordinary, often less serious, street crimes, then as a 
matter of principle we have to be prepared to accept that prison can also act as a 
similar deterrent for very serious white collar wrongdoing. Though our criminal 
justice system, in its ideology and generality, is geared towards the notion of being 
class neutral, the reality is somewhat different. Finally, we should not underestimate 
the powerful cathartic effects that the proper use of criminal law can provide in 
society. Many Irish citizens have grown weary of ‘wink and nod’ politics, ‘golden 
circles’, ‘golden handshakes’, massive spends on tribunals with little or no real 
consequences, and the degree to which the rich and powerful appear to be immunised 
from the full reach of the law. In these circumstances the criminal law and the 
punishments that follow it can act as a platform for the expression of collective 
outrage. The criminal law is designed to uphold moral sensibilities and it permits a 
powerful message to be conveyed in relation to the anger felt by ordinary citizens 
about the commission of certain crimes. It also acts as an important safety valve, 
limiting the ‘demoralising effects’ on society of the consequences of serious 
misconduct. Of course, in saying this, one should be careful not to employ the 
criminal law to scapegoat individuals, to facilitate intolerance and repression, or to 
punish excessively. The courts, however, have developed a comprehensive 
jurisprudence, largely in the street crime field, for ensuring fairness of procedures and 
proportionately of punishments which should allay any concerns we have in this 
regard.    
2.5 Regulatory crime in Ireland 
There are a number of interesting characteristics about the current use of these 
regulatory strategies in Ireland. Since the 1990s, we have increasingly witnessed the 
extensive use of regulatory strategies in areas such as competition law, environmental 
protection, health and safety law, and consumer and corporate affairs (see Colin Scott, 
‘Regulatory Crime: History, Functions, Problems, Solutions’ in Kilcommins and 
Kilkelly, eds, Regulatory Crime in Ireland, 2010, 63-86 at 69). An official report 
produced by the Better Regulation Unit in 2007 found that there were 213 bodies with 
statutory regulatory powers. These strategies are supported by a wide range of 
criminal sanctions available summarily and on indictment.  
2.5.1 INCREASED GOVERNANCE 
First, the emergence of this regulatory criminal framework is significantly different 
from the unified monopolies of centralised control underpinning policing and 
prosecution in the modern State. Arguably these new techniques and strategies can be 
seen as part of a pattern of more, rather than less, governance, but taking ‘decentred’, 
‘at-a-distance’ forms. Prior to the nineteenth century, the institution of local policing 
was heavily orientated towards the ‘creation of an orderly environment, especially for 
trade and commerce’ (see J. Braithwaite, Neoliberalism or Regulatory Capitalism 
Canberra, Regulatory Institutions Network, 2005, 13-14). It did not focus exclusively 
on offences against persons and property, but also included the regulation of 
‘customs, trade, highways, foodstuffs, health, labour standards, fire, forests and 
hunting, street life, migration and immigration communities’ (see J. Braithwaite, ‘The 
New Regulatory State and the Transformation of Criminology’ 40 Brit. J. Criminol.  
2000: 222-238 at 225). Throughout the nineteenth century, however, the State very 
gradually began to monopolise and separate the prosecutorial and policing functions, 
particularly for serious crimes. In terms of policing, this meant that uniformed 
paramilitary police were preoccupied with the punitive regulation of the poor to the 
almost total exclusion of any interest in the constitution of markets and the just 
regulation of commerce, became one of the most universal of globalised regulatory 
models.  
From the mid-19
th
 century, factories inspectorates, mines inspectorates, liquor 
licensing boards, weights and measures inspectorates, health and sanitation, food 
inspectorates and countless others were created to begin to fill the vacuum left by 
constables now concentrating only on crime. Business regulation became variegated 
into many specialist regulatory branches (Braithwaite 2005: 15-16). In Ireland, these 
specialist agencies included the Bacon Marketing Board, the Irish Tourist Board, the 
Racing Board, the Health Authorities, CIE, Bord na gCon, and the Opticians Board.  
Similarly during the course of the nineteenth century conflicts were no longer viewed 
as the property of the parties most directly affected. Previously strong stakeholder 
interests in the prosecution process, such as victims and the local community, were 
gradually colonised in the course of the nineteenth century by a State apparatus which 
acted for rather than with the public.   
Now, however, the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions is, to some extent, 
increasingly losing its monopoly role. The number of administrative agencies that 
have entered the criminal justice arena, colonising the power to investigate regulatory 
crimes in specific areas and to prosecute summarily, has increased dramatically in 
Ireland in recent years. They include: the Revenue Commissioners, the Competition 
Authority, the Director of Consumer Affairs, the Environmental Protection Agency, 
the Health and Safety Authority, and the Office of the Director of Corporate 
Enforcement.  
Significantly, these agencies have both investigative and prosecution functions, with 
each pursuing their own agendas, policies and practices e.g. in 2009, the Competition 
Authority investigated price fixing of Citroen cars by members of the Citroen Dealers 
Association. Suspended custodial sentences were imposed by the courts ranging from 
six to nine months, in addition to fines ranging from €2,000 to €80,000. The National 
Employment Rights Authority can also initiate summary criminal prosecutions where 
a breach of employment rights legislation has been identified. In 2013, NERA 
initiated 84 prosecutions, an increase of 20% from 2013.  
The Office of Environmental Enforcement within the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) is dedicated to the implementation and enforcement of environmental 
legislation in Ireland. For example, on 19 February 2014 the EPA prosecuted Oxigen 
Environmental at Dundalk District Court. The Company pleaded guilty to a variety of 
offences including “[f]ailing to ensure that the activities were carried out in a manner 
such that emissions did not result in significant impairment of or significant 
interference with the environment beyond the facility boundary”. On hearing details 
of the offences Judge Brennan convicted the Company and imposed a fine of €1,000. 
Costs of €9,000 were also awarded. 
Similarly, the Food Safety Authority of Ireland enforces food safety legislation in 
Ireland. Since 2005 all enforcements are served by the Health Service Executive. In 
July 2014, for example, the HSE prosecuted Cameo Cinema Limited in Wexford for 
breach of EC (Hygiene of Foodstuffs) Regulations, 2006 (S.I. No. 369 of 2006). A 
fine of €1,000 was imposed with costs of €800 and expenses of €250.  
The Health and Safety Authority can also prosecute cases summarily. On the 11th of 
July 2012, for example, Ross Oil Company pleaded guilty to two charges under the 
Safety Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005. The case related to an accident which 
occurred on the 24th of January 2011, when an employee slipped and fell from the 
roof of a tanker he was loading and suffered injury. A fine of €1,000 was imposed in 
Macroom District Court.  
Prosecuting a trader who has broken the law is also the ultimate sanction available to 
the National Consumer Agency. This power is available under the National Consumer 
Act, 2007. In June 2014, for example, Mr Timmy Keane, a car salesman operating at 
VK Motors, in Harold's Cross, Dublin was convicted at Dublin District Court of a 
breach of the Consumer Protection Act 2007 involving providing false information in 
relation to a vehicle's mileage. Mr Keane was fined €500 and ordered to pay 
compensation of €7,000. VK Motors Ltd was also convicted and fined €500.   
The primary function of the Enforcement Unit of the Office of the Director of 
Corporate Enforcement is to gather evidence to support the possible initiation of 
criminal proceedings in cases of suspected breaches of Company Law. This work 
includes: determining which cases should be initiated; defining the most appropriate 
proceedings;  instructing counsel; preparing case papers; and managing case 
execution and considering appeals.  
Principally, the above areas involve the initiation of summary prosecutions at District 
Court level but the enforcement unit may also assist the DPP (Director of Public 
Prosecutions) where cases have been referred there for decision as to whether 
prosecutions on indictment should be commenced.  
In the Director of Corporate Enforcement v Lauri Quinn, 1
st
 April, 2014, the 
defendant was charged with  acting as auditor of four companies when not qualified to 
do so contrary to Section 187 (1) of the Companies Act 1990 and with completing and 
producing false reports as the auditors of those same companies contrary to Section 
242(1) of the Companies Act 1990.  The defendant pleaded guilty and was convicted 
of seven offences pursuant to Section 187 and a further seven charges pursuant to 
Section 242. A fine of €1,500 was imposed and the defendant was directed to pay 
prosecution costs of €1,250. Similarly, in the Director of Corporate Enforcement v 
McEvoy’s Self Service Drapery Limited, 3rd February 2011, the defendant was 
charged with five offences under Section 202 of the Companies Act, 1990, which 
requires the keeping of proper books of account. On a plea of guilty, the Court 
convicted the defendant of five offences under Section 202 of the Companies Act, 
1990, imposed fines totalling €3,000 and directed the defendant to pay prosecution 
costs of €1,115.  
All of these administrative agencies that have entered the criminal justice arena 
represent more criminal regulation by the State, as well as of the State, rather than any 
‘hollowing out’ of the State (J. Braithwaite, Neoliberalism or Regulatory Capitalism, 
2005, p.  26). This enlargement in scope, however, is fragmented in nature, occupying 
diverse sites and modes of operation. Despite extensive powers to share information, 
there is no unifying strategy across the agencies or with other law enforcement 
institutions such as the DPP or Gardaí. Staffing levels, resources, workloads and 
working practices vary from agency to agency. Indeed, and apart from respective 
annual reports, there is little in the way of an accountability structure overseeing the 
policy choices of the various regulatory agencies, the manner in which they invoke 
their considerable investigative and enforcement powers, or the way in which 
information is shared between them and with the Gardaí. 
2.5.2 INSTRUMENTALISM 
Many aspects of regulatory crime operate in opposition to the general trend of 
paradigmatic criminal law which permits general defences, demands both a conduct 
element and a fault element, and respects procedural standards such as a legal burden 
of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Pure doctrines of subjective culpability and the 
presumption of innocence are increasingly abandoned within this streamlined 
regulatory framework to make up for difficulties of proof in complex cases.  
The increasingly instrumental nature of criminal legal regulation is evident, for 
example, in the introduction of ‘reverse onus’ provisions that require the accused to 
displace a presumption of guilt. Section 383(2) of the 1963 Companies Act as 
amended by section 100 of the Company Law Enforcement Act, 2001, for example, 
states that an officer of a company ‘shall be presumed to have permitted a breach by 
the company’ unless s/he can establish that s/he took all reasonable steps to prevent it 
or that by reason of circumstances beyond his control s/he was unable to do so. 
Previously section 383 of the 1963 Companies Act required the prosecution in such 
cases to prove that the officer ‘knowingly and wilfully’ authorised or permitted the 
default refusal or contravention (see G Bohan, ‘Radical Change – Some Key Features 
of the Company Law Enforcement Act 2001’ 15(1) Irish Tax Review 63-68).  
Similarly, section 81 of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act, 2005 now 
provides that in any proceedings for an offence under the Act consisting of a failure to 
comply with a duty or requirement to do something so far as is reasonably practicable, 
‘it shall be for the accused to prove’ that it was not reasonably practicable to do more 
than was in fact done to satisfy the duty or requirement. Section 8(6) of the 
Competition Act, 2002 makes the directors of an undertaking, its management or 
anyone acting in a similar capacity liable for criminal wrongdoing under the Act. 
Indeed section 8(7) makes a presumption that such a person has consented, ‘until the 
contrary is proved’, to the doing of the acts by the undertaking which infringe sections 
6 (the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in trade in any goods or 
services) and 7 (any abuse of a dominant position in trade for any goods or services) 
of the Act. Section 6(2) of 2002 Act also creates a presumption that: 
‘an agreement between competing undertakings, a decision made by an 
association of competing undertakings or a concerted practice engaged in by 
competing undertakings the purpose of which is to  
a) directly or indirectly fix prices with respect to the provision of goods 
or services to persons not party to the agreement, decision or concerted 
practice, 
b) limit output or sales, or 
c) share markets or customers, 
has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in trade 
in any goods or services in the state or in any part of the state or within the 
common market, as the case may be, unless the defendant proves otherwise.’ 
 
The system of justice that applies in the regulatory realm is thus more exculpatory in 
orientation than its ordinary criminal counterpart.  
It is also evident in the instrumental fault element requirements of criminal regulation. 
The attachment of subjective mental element to wrongdoing in conventional criminal 
law is often severed in the regulatory criminal arena where objective standards of 
culpability apply. Section 383(3) of the 1963 Companies Act, as amended by section 
100 of the Company Law Enforcement Act, 2001, for example, states that it is the 
duty of each company to ensure that they comply with all the requirements of the 
Companies Acts. As such officers are personally responsible for ensuring compliance. 
If it is demonstrated that a company has committed a criminal offence, the officer 
must prove that s/he has not permitted the breach and has taken all reasonable steps to 
prevent it. Similarly, section 58 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) 
Act, 2001 provides that any company officer or any person purporting to act in that 
capacity may be convicted of an offence under the Act (such as false accounting, 
suppression of documents) if it is proved that the offence was carried out with his/her 
consent, connivance, or is attributable to his/her neglect. Under section 80 of the 
Health, Safety and Welfare at Work Act, 2005, where a health and safety offence has 
been committed by a body corporate, and that offence is shown to have been 
committed with the consent or connivance of, or to have been attributable to any 
neglect on the part of any director, that person may be prosecuted in addition to the 
corporate body. The seizure of the proceeds of crime too is premised on the notion 
that criminals often put themselves beyond the reaches of the ordinary criminal code, 
by not becoming directly involved in the commission of offences and by strict 
enforcement of codes of secrecy. Seizure and taxation of criminal assets is a means by 
which to lift the veil and ‘get at’ the controlling and guiding minds of such criminal 
organisations. 
Moreover, any defences that might exist in the regulatory area are also more 
specialised than might be the case in the general defences that apply in criminal law. 
For example, in competition law, it is a specific defence to show that the agreement, 
decision or concerted practice complained of, benefited from a declaration from the 
Competition Authority that the practice complained of contributes to improvement in 
the production or distribution of goods and services; or promotes technical or 
economic progress. Similarly, section 78 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2007 
provides a defence where the accused ‘exercised due diligence and took all reasonable 
precautions to avoid commission of the offence’ and where, in a variety of ways, the 
matter was not wholly within the control of the accused. Finally, some of the general 
duties placed on employers under the 2005 Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 
are qualified by the term ‘reasonably practicable’. This means that employers have 
exercised all due care when, having identified the hazards and assessed the risks at 
their workplaces, they have put into place the necessary protective and preventive 
measures, and where further measures would be grossly disproportionate (having 
regard to unusual, unforeseeable and exceptional circumstances). 
Employing instrumentalist reasoning can give rise to difficulties, particularly in 
relation to constitutional justice and due process safeguards. For example in 
Kavanagh v Delaney and others [2008] IESC 1, the respondents were directors of a 
company at the date of the commencement of its winding up. The first respondent, D, 
was the managing director of the company and the sole executive director. The fourth 
respondent, C, was a chartered accountant and the terms of his appointment as a non-
executive director were that he should receive and review financial information from 
the executives of the company and attend certain directors’ meetings as a non-
executive director. He did not play an active part in the management of the company. 
According to the records produced by the directors of the company, a very large 
deficiency in its assets occurred during the last six months of trading for which, in the 
view of the applicant (the official liquidator of the company), no reasonable 
explanation had been given. At the time of the commencement of the winding up, 
initiated by C, the company was unable to pay its debts. In those circumstances the 
applicant was obliged by s. 150 of the Companies Act, 1990 (as amended by the 
Company Law Enforcement Act, 2001) to bring restriction proceedings in relation to 
all of the respondents and would be guilty of a criminal offence if he did not. 
Believing that C had acted honestly and responsibly in relation to the affairs of the 
company, the applicant petitioned the Director of Corporate Enforcement to be 
relieved of the obligation to make a restriction application in respect of C, but the 
Director refused the applicant’s request without giving reasons for his refusal. In the 
Supreme Court, it was held inter alia that having regard to the need to respect C’s 
constitutional rights, not only to fair procedures, but to his good name and the 
associated right to earn a living by the practice of his profession, it was not 
appropriate to restrict C in the circumstances. As Hardiman J noted: 
[T]he provisions may be regarded as draconian in the sense that, by reason of 
s. 150(2)(a) of the 1990 Act, a restriction order must be made against a 
respondent unless the court is satisfied that he has acted honestly and 
responsibly in relation to the conduct of the affairs of the Company and is also 
satisfied that ‘there is no other reason why it would be just and equitable’ to 
make a restriction order. The burden is placed upon the respondent to prove, 
not only that he has acted responsibly and honestly in relation to the Company 
but to prove the negative proposition ‘(there is no other reason...)’ set out in 
the last citation from the Statute... 
I must confess to some doubt as to whether this blanket reversal of the onus of 
proof, including a requirement to prove a negative proposition, is consistent 
with fundamental fairness and constitutional justice. 
In PJ Carey Contractors Limited v DPP [2012] IR 234 Section 6 of the Safety, Health 
and Welfare at Work Act 1989 provides, inter alia, that it shall be the duty of every 
employer to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the safety, health and welfare 
at work of all his employees and, at s. 6(2)(d), the provision of systems of work that 
are planned, organised, performed and maintained so as to be, so far as is reasonably 
practicable, safe and without risk to health. Section 50 of that Act provides that in any 
proceedings for an offence consisting of a failure to comply with a duty or 
requirement to do something so far as is practicable or so far as is reasonably 
practicable, or to use the best practicable means to do something, it shall be for the 
accused to prove (as the case may be) that it was not practicable or not reasonably 
practicable to do more than was in fact done to satisfy the duty or requirement, or that 
there was no better practicable means than was in fact used to satisfy the duty or 
requirement. The applicant was charged with certain offences contrary to the Act of 
1989, in particular under s. 6, following the collapse of a trench on a building site 
which had resulted in the death of an employee. During the trial uncontroverted 
evidence was adduced that the system of work adopted was, as far as was reasonably 
practicable, safe and without risk. An application was made by the applicant to 
withdraw the entire case from the jury on the basis that there was no case to answer 
given that all the evidence called from persons who were present at the time of the 
accident favoured the accused. Some of the charges were withdrawn. However, the 
applicant was convicted of offences contrary to s. 6 of the Act of 1989 regarding the 
alleged failure of the accused to provide a safe system of work. The prosecutor relied 
on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and on s. 50 of the Act of 1989 submitting that the 
provision reversed the legal burden of proof onto the applicant requiring it to prove 
that it had adopted a safe system of work. The applicant appealed against the 
conviction. It was held by the Court of Criminal Appeal in allowing the appeal and 
setting aside the conviction, that the offence under s. 6 (2)(d) of the Act of 1989 was 
not complete merely on proof that the trench had collapsed. It required proof of a 
failure to provide a safe system of work. It was also held that s. 50 of the Act of 1989 
created a reversed burden of proof which cast an evidential burden only on the 
accused and not a substantive onus of legal proof, and that that evidential burden had 
been discharged by the accused. 
Hardiman J stated:  
It appears to me that, having referred to s. 50 of the Act of 1989, the trial judge 
then misinterpreted its purport so as to cast a substantive onus of legal proof 
upon the defendant...It appears to me that the foregoing passages envisage an 
obligation on the defendant to explain certain things and suggests the 
inadequacy of such explanation. But that is a misconstruction of the effect of 
s. 50 which is merely to cast an evidential, and not a legal or substantive 
burden on the defendant. I believe that this was an error of law by the trial 
judge and, that if this error had not occurred, it would have been manifest that 
the defendant was entitled to a direction. 
 Aside from reverse onus provisions, the privilege against self-incrimination may also 
give rise to difficulties. In Saunders v UK (ECHR) (1996) 23 EHRR 313, the 
applicant was convicted for fraud in the connection of the takeover by Guinness of 
Distillers. Section 434 of the Companies Act, 1985 compelled him, upon pain of 
conviction, to furnish information to inspectors that could be admitted as evidence 
against him in a criminal trial for participating in illegal share support schemes. The 
Court held by 16 to 4 that the use at Saunders’s trial of statements obtained from him 
by the Department of Trade and Industry violated Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, particularly having regard to the privilege against self-
incrimination. Closer to home, in Re National Irish Bank [1999] 3 IR 145, inspectors 
were appointed under the Companies Acts, 1990 to examine the affairs of National 
Irish Bank. Section 10 of the Act places a duty on officers of the company to 
cooperate with inspectors and to produce documents and answer questions. Section 18 
provided that an answer given by a person ‘may be used in evidence against him’. In 
the Supreme Court it was held that section 10 did not allow evidence obtained in such 
circumstances to be admitted in a subsequent criminal trial. Section 29 of the 
Company Law Enforcement Act, 2001 now immunises the answers given to an 
authorised officer from being used in any subsequent criminal proceedings. Similarly, 
section 15(10) of the Criminal Justice Act 2011 provides that any statement or 
admission made by a person pursuant to an order under that section is not admissible 
as evidence in subsequent proceedings brought against the person for an offence, 
other than an offence under subsection (15), (16) or (17) of the Act.  
In Environmental Protection Agency v. Swalcliffe Limited [2004] IEHC 190 the 
accused was a company which held a waste licence, subject to certain conditions, 
including, inter alia, the requirement to keep certain records. A prosecution was 
brought for alleged breaches of the said licence. The prosecution sought to adduce 
into evidence a waste licence audit report, the contents of which were based on 
records maintained by the accused. The accused argued that the report and the oral 
evidence to be adduced thereon were inadmissible on the basis that the records upon 
which the material part of the audit was based were not maintained voluntarily by the 
accused but were maintained pursuant to the requirements of the Waste Management 
Act 1996. The accused argued that to the extent that any of the records contained 
details which suggested that the accused had committed a criminal offence under the 
Act of 1996, it amounted to an involuntary confession and that there was no provision 
under the Act of 1996 permitting the admission of such involuntary confessions. In 
the High Court, Kearns J held that records brought into being as part of a scheme of 
regulation are admissible at trial and do not violate the principle against self-
incrimination. 
 
In my view the privilege against self-incrimination is not involved at all in this 
case. The rationale for the privilege is clear. It is to protect against unreliable 
confessions and to protect against abuses of power by the State. Quite clearly 
there is both a societal and individual interest in achieving both of these 
protections which are linked to the value placed by society upon individual 
privacy, personal autonomy and dignity…In applying for a waste licence, the 
accused must be taken as having freely accepted the conditions attaching to 
the licence, which formed part of the entire package under the regulatory 
scheme. It was the accused's own free choice to participate in the particular 
activity and at the time they chose to do so they were well aware of their 
record keeping obligations and of the penalties for non-compliance with the 
requirements of the Act of 1996. 
 
In a recent case, DPP v Collins (Unreported, Circuit Court, 27 September 2007), the 
Revenue’s attempt to produce what appeared to be compelled documents in a criminal 
prosecution was held to infringe the accused’s right to the privilege against self –
incrimination. He had been sent an initial letter in relation to undeclared tax liabilities 
and a bogus non-resident account which stated: ‘failure to comply...may result in ...a 
referral for investigation with a view to prosecution’. If he complied, it was indicated 
that he would be dealt with under section 1086(2) of the Tax Consolidation Act 1997, 
and would not be subject to criminal law. The accused made a disclosure and the 
Revenue authorities then sought to use some of the evidence therein as part of the 
criminal prosecution. This was held to violate his right to the privilege against self-
incrimination (Duggan, Disclosure to Revenue and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, (2008) ITR 70).      
 
 
 
 
In addition, it is felt that mens rea ‘must be presumed to be a necessary ingredient of 
all serious offences’ (CC v Ireland and Others [2006] IESC 33; The Employment 
Equality Bill 1996 [1997] 2 IR 321). In Brady v Environmental Protection Agency 
[2007] IEHC 58, Charleton J at para 41 noted: ‘It is difficult to see offences of 
absolute or strict liability being compatible with the constitutional scheme where they 
go beyond the regulation of society through the imposition of small penalties based 
upon absolute or strict liability.’ There is also, however, some Irish and ECHR 
support for the view that a defence of due diligence will suffice to justify a regulatory 
offence of strict liability. In CC v Ireland and Others [2006] IESC 33, for example, 
this was suggested by Hardiman J in passing (though he did not rule specifically on 
the matter). In particular, he referred to the cases of Regina v City of Sault Sainte 
Marine [1978] 85 DLR 161 and the dissenting judgment of Keane J in Shannon 
Regional Fisheries Board v Cavan County Council [1996] 3 IR 267. Moreover, the 
decision of Shannon Regional Fisheries Board v Cavan County Council [1996] 3 IR 
267, which held that there was no requirement of a mens rea element for regulatory 
offences, has not been expressly overruled by the judgment in CC. In terms of ECHR 
jurisprudence, in Salabiaku v France (1998) EHRR 379, the European Court of 
Human Rights held that ‘the contracting States may, under certain conditions, 
penalize a simple or objective fact as such irrespective of whether it results from 
criminal intent or from negligence’. It went on to note, however, that presumptions of 
fact or law should be confined within ‘reasonable limits’. This may provide some 
degree of leeway for crimes that can be classified as regulatory in nature. 
 
Another difficulty is the emphasis that the law of evidence traditionally places on oral 
testimony. This may sometimes pose a dilemma in the arena of regulatory 
wrongdoing where documentary trails may form a central part of an investigation. 
Though the Criminal Evidence Act, 1992 provides for an inclusionary approach to 
documentary evidence in criminal proceedings, this has not as of yet been extended to 
civil proceedings. In practice, however, lawyers in the civil context routinely agree in 
advance of the hearing to admit expert reports and documentary information, as a 
matter of procedural convenience and mutual benefit. For example, in Shelley-Morris 
v Bus Átha Cliath [2003] 1 IR 232, a personal injuries action, the Supreme Court 
noted that it had been agreed between the parties that medical reports from the United 
Kingdom would be received into evidence in substitution for oral evidence. The 
Bankers’ Books Evidence Act, 1879 as amended provides for the admissibility of 
copies of entries from the books and records of banks against any person as prima 
facie evidence. There is a wide definition of bankers’ books in the 1879 Act, as 
amended, and this includes any records used in the ordinary course of the business of 
a bank or used in the transfer department of a bank acting as a register of securities. It 
should also be noted that the principles and rules of the law of evidence apply 
traditionally to hard-copy, paper-based documents. Electronic and automated 
documentary evidence currently poses more difficulties. A recent Consultation Paper 
on Documentary and Electronic Evidence (LRC CP 57 – 2009) recommends that 
documentary evidence should be admissible in civil and criminal proceedings where 
the court is satisfied as to its relevance and necessity. It also recommends that a 
technology-neutral approach should be adopted so that the term documentary 
evidence should, in general, apply to traditional paper-based documents and to 
electronic documents. 
Finally, in defining a crime in Ireland in cases such as Melling v O’Mathghamhna 
[1962] IR 1, the Irish courts have adopted a very traditional approach, emphasising 
indicia such as procedural characteristics (powers of arrest, detention, bail etc.), due 
process safeguards (the presumption of innocence, the right to liberty, the right to a 
jury trial), and punitive elements. As McGrath (J McGrath, ‘The Colonisation of Real 
Crime in the Name of All Crime’ in Kilcommins and Vaughan, eds, Regulatory 
Crime in Ireland, Dublin: First Law, 60-61) notes, these ‘features are often associated 
with traditional criminal offences. This analysis has marginalised corporate 
criminality, often enforced by regulatory law, from the crime debate… Melling and 
the cases following it speak to real crime so attempting to make conventional crime 
indicia fit into regulatory contexts is inappropriate. The jurisprudence needs to be re-
evaluated and a new approach must be found.’ 
 
2.5.3 INFORMATION SHARING AND MANDATORY 
REPORTING 
What also appears to be emerging in recent years is the increasing adoption of a more 
variegated approach straddling both civil and criminal jurisdictions to the detection, 
investigation and punishment of offences. For example, the organisational make-up of 
the Criminal Assets Bureau comprises Revenue Commissioners, Department of Social 
Community and Family Affairs officials and Gardaí, all directing their respective 
competencies at proceeds from criminal activities. More specifically, section 17 of the 
Company Law Enforcement Act of 2001, for example, permits the Director of 
Corporate Enforcement to share information with other prosecuting authorities, as 
well as Tribunals of Inquiry, the Revenue Commissioners and An Garda Síochána. In 
some instances individuals are required to become ‘information reporters’. Section 42 
of the Criminal Justice (Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing) Act 2010 
requires the financial services industry and professional service providers (including 
auditors, accountants, tax advisers, legal practitioners) to report suspicious transaction 
to the Garda Siochana and the Revenue Commissioners (S Horan, Corporate Crime, 
2011, Bloomsbury Professional,, pp. 1529-1540). Similarly, section 192(6) of the 
Companies Act, 1990, as amended, requires that where a disciplinary tribunal of a 
recognised body of accountants has reasonable grounds for believing that an 
indictable offence has been committed by a person while the person was a member of 
the body, the body shall inform the Director of Corporate Enforcement. A similar 
provision exists under section 194, as amended, as regards the auditors of a company 
who must notify any failure to keep proper books of account (Re Bovale 
Developments; DCE v Bailey [2008] 2 ILRM 13). Section 192 of the Companies Act 
1990, as amended by section 73 of the Company Law Enforcement Act of 2001, 
provides that whenever disciplinary tribunals of accountancy bodies have reasonable 
grounds for believing that an indictable offence has been committed by one of their 
members, it must report the suspicion to the Director of Corporate Enforcement. 
Auditors are also required, when carrying out an audit of a company, to report 
suspicions of indictable offences having been committed under the Companies Acts to 
the Director of Corporate Enforcement, and provide details on how the opinion of a 
suspicion was formed (Section 194, Companies Act 1990). Section 299 of the 
Companies Act 1963, as amended by section 51 of the Company Law Enforcement 
Act 2001, requires a liquidator in the course of a voluntary winding up of a company 
to report any suspected criminal activity of company officers to the DPP and the 
Director of Corporate Enforcement. Section 59 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and 
Fraud Offences) Act, 2001 provides that any professional assisting in the preparation 
of figures or computations which might be used in the preparation of accounts, has a 
duty to report acts of theft, making gain or causing loss by deception, obtaining 
services by deception, fraud or deception through the use of a computer, false 
accounting and suppression of documents. A significant broadening in the obligation 
to disclose information is contained in the Criminal Justice Act 2011. Section 19 of 
the Criminal Justice Act 2011 makes it an offence for a person to fail to disclose 
information to An Garda Síochána as soon as practicable and without reasonable 
excuse, which the individual knows or believes might be of material assistance in “(a) 
preventing the commission by any other person of a relevant offence, or (b) securing 
the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of any other person for a relevant 
offence”. Section three of the Act defines “relevant offence” broadly including 
offences relating to banking and finance, company law, money laundering, theft, 
fraud, bribery, corruption, competition, consumer protection, cybercrime and tax 
collection, with 30 offences specified in Schedule 1. Upon conviction on indictment a 
defendant may be subject to a maximum prison sentence of five years or a fine or 
both.  
The difficulties of prosecuting regulatory crime are well documented. In addition to 
facilitating exchange of information and compelling certain parties to become 
information reporters, the authorities are increasingly also seeking to protect and 
encourage witnesses to come forward and provide evidence. ‘Whistleblowers’ have 
been crucially important in Ireland on lifting the lid on various abuses such as the care 
of the elderly and corruption in banks (Transparency International Ireland, An 
Alternative to Silence: whistleblower protection in Ireland, 2010 Dublin: 
Transparency Ireland). Encouraging such witnesses to provide information ordinarily 
takes two forms: protection and/or immunity. In relation to protection, section 6 of the 
Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, for example, provides that a dismissal will be deemed to 
be unfair if it was brought about as a result of the employee making a complaint to a 
prosecuting authority in which he or she was likely to be a witness. Similarly section 
27 of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005, section 87 of the Consumer 
Protection Act 2007, and section 26 of the Employment Permits Act 2006 provide that 
an employer is not permitted to penalise an employee for reporting health and safety, 
consumer or employment permit breaches respectively. Similarly, section 20 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2011 provides protection for employees against penalisation or 
threatened penalisation for making a disclosure, giving evidence in relation to a 
disclosure or for giving notice of an intention to disclose information in relation to a 
“relevant offence” as defined in the Act. However, there is an exemption included in 
the act to ensure that an employer is not prevented from carrying on the business in an 
efficient manner or taking actions necessary for economic, technical or organisational 
reasons in some circumstances.  
 
More generally, the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 requires all public sector bodies 
in Ireland to put in place whistleblowing policies which meet the requirements of the 
Act. Where private sector businesses have policies in place, they need to review them 
to ensure that they are aligned to the requirements of the Act. The Act protects 
‘workers’ in all sectors who make a ‘protected disclosure’. The term ‘worker’ 
includes employees (public and private sector), contractors, trainees, agency staff, 
former employees and job seekers. ‘Protected disclosure’ means disclosure of relevant 
information, which in the reasonable belief of the worker tends to show one or more 
relevant wrongdoings and came to the attention of the worker in connection with their 
employment. ‘Relevant wrongdoings’ include the commission of an offence, non-
compliance with a legal obligation, health and safety threats, misuse of public monies; 
mismanagement by a public official; damage to the environment, or concealment or 
destruction of information relating to any of the foregoing. The Act protects  
whistleblowers from dismissal for having made a protected disclosure. The worker 
can be awarded compensation of up to five years' remuneration for unfair dismissal on 
the grounds of having made a protected disclosure. Other protection measures 
provided for in the Act include: protection from penalisation by the employer; civil 
immunity from action for damages and a qualified privilege under defamation law; 
and a right of action in tort where a whistleblower or a member of his family 
experiences coercion, intimidation, harassment or discrimination at the hands of a 
third party; protection of his/her identity (subject to certain exceptions). 
 
Immunity programmes are not as universal. The Competition Authority, however, 
does operates a Cartel Immunity Programme, which provides immunity from criminal 
prosecution for suspected individuals who are willing to cooperate and testify on 
behalf of the prosecution (P Gorecki and D McFadden, ‘Criminal Cartels in Ireland: 
The Heating Oil Case, 11 European Competition Law Review 2006, 631-640). 
 
2.5.4 POWERS 
Very wide powers of entry, inspection, examination, search, seizure and analysis are 
given to some of these agencies. For example, under section 64 of the Health and 
Safety Act, 2005, health and safety inspectors are, inter alia, entitled to enter any 
place with the consent of the occupier or with a warrant and inquire into, search, 
examine and inspect the place and any work activity; require records to be produced; 
inspect and take copies of such records; remove and retain records; and require the 
employer or any employee to give the inspector any information that the inspector 
may reasonably require for the purposes of any search, examination, investigation, 
inspection or inquiry. In relation to company law, section 19 of the Companies Act 
1990 empowers the Director of Corporate Enforcement to require company officers to 
produce for inspection specified books, and documents where there are circumstances 
which suggest that fraud, illegality, or prejudice may have occurred. The 
constitutionality of the provision was upheld in Dunnes Stores Ireland Co v Ryan 
[2002] 2 IR 60. Section 20(2) of the Companies Act, 1990, as amended, provides that 
a search warrant may be issued to authorise the Director of Corporate Enforcement to 
enter and search premises and seize and retain any material information found on the 
premises or in the custody or possession of any person found on the premises.   
 
Similarly, section 30 of the Competition Act 2002 permits the Competition Authority 
to summon witnesses to attend before it, examine witnesses attending, and require 
such witnesses to produce any document in their power or control.  Section 45(4) of 
the same Act permits the Competition Authority to obtain a search warrant to enter by 
force and seize, from a premises of suspected undertakings (and the homes of 
individuals involved in their management) any books, records and documents relating 
to the activity of an undertaking. Persons on the premises may also be required to 
answer certain questions relating to the activity engaged in by the undertaking. . In 
respect of revenue offences, the Revenue authorities has very broad powers of search 
and seizure and can enter a business/dwelling where a trade is being carried on 
without a warrant (section 905 Tax Consolidation Act 1997)Section 905(2A) of the 
same Act provides for the issuance of search warrants to search any premises and 
section 900 provides very broad powers to require the production of books, records, 
other documents, which may contain information relevant to liability (Considine, J 
and Kilcommins, S ‘The Importance of Safeguards on Revenue Powers; another 
perspective’ Irish Tax Review 2006, 19(6): 49-54).. In Competition Authority v The 
Irish Dental Association [2005] IEHC 361 the defendant was a company limited by 
guarantee which had about 1200 members being practising dentists. The plaintiff 
commenced proceedings against the defendant in respect of alleged breaches of the 
Act, seeking certain declarations as well as injunctive relief. In the course of those 
proceedings, the plaintiff obtained a search warrant authorising it to search the 
defendant’s business premises. The warrant wrongly made reference to the defendant 
being involved in the business of selling, supplying or distributing motor vehicles. 
The plaintiff carried out the search and seized certain documents belonging to the 
defendant. It was common ground that the defendant had no connection whatsoever 
with such a business. The defendant commenced proceedings against the plaintiff on 
the basis that the documents so obtained had been obtained in breach of the 
defendant’s constitutional rights and its right to privacy, with the result that they 
should be declared inadmissible. 
The court ruled: 
Where the evidence in question was obtained purely by illegal means, there 
was a discretion for the court to exercise which involved balancing competing 
interests, unless there existed also within the circumstances of that case, 
‘extraordinary excusing circumstances’. If on the other hand, such evidence 
also involved a conscious and deliberate violation of one’s constitutional 
rights, then in the absence of extraordinary excusing circumstances, that 
evidence should be disallowed. 
Applying established principles, it was clear that the plaintiff had constitutional rights 
and that such rights of freedom and expression, most certainly and probably also those 
of privacy, were not too remote so as to exclude their application to the present 
circumstances. In the circumstances, given that the search warrant was illegal and 
given the existence of those rights, the activities carried out by the plaintiff on the 
occasion in question, had constituted a breach of the defendant’s constitutional rights. 
Accordingly, the court had no discretion with regard to the material in question. 
 
More recently, the Criminal Justice Act 2011 gave power to An Garda Síochána to 
apply to the District Court for an order compelling the provision of documents 
(recorded in any form) or information “by answering questions or making a statement 
containing the information” (s. 15(1)) which may assist in the investigation of a 
“relevant offence” in certain circumstances. As mentioned previously, “relevant 
offence” is defined broadly including offences which may not typically be considered 
to be white collar offences such as the offence of theft under section 4 of the Criminal 
Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001. 
 
Part Two of the same Act, the Criminal Justice Act 2011, also includes interesting 
provisions relating to powers of detention. Section 7(a) amends section 4 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1984 and gives investigators the opportunity to suspend a period 
of detention of a person detained in respect of a “relevant offence” where there are 
“reasonable grounds for believing that it is necessary for the purpose of permitting 
enquiries or investigations to be made for the further and proper investigation of the 
offence concerned”. Detention may be suspended twice; however, not more than four 
months may elapse from the date the detention is first suspended. Section 8 provides 
the Gardaí with powers to arrest and return suspects for continuation of detention 
where the individual has not returned for questioning as required under the Act and 
makes it an offence to fail to return to a Garda station for a further period of detention 
for questioning. The Act also contains provisions relating to rest periods between 
midnight and 8am (s 7(c)) and the right of access to legal advice (s9); however, these 
provisions have yet to be commenced.  
2.5.5 SANCTIONING 
There is also some evidence of a possible drift towards a more punitive approach to 
regulation (R Baldwin, ‘The New Punitive Regulation’ 67(3) M.L.R. 2004: 351-383). 
Traditionally it had been said that the focus of the sanctions for many of these 
regulatory offences was more ‘apersonal’ in nature than their ordinary counterparts. 
The argument was that ‘these were not real crimes to which stigma should attach, but 
were rather in the nature of administrative regulations with non-stigmatising penalties 
such as fines’ (N Lacey, ‘Criminalisation as Regulation: The Role of Criminal Law’ 
in C Parker et al, eds, Regulating Law Oxford: OUP, 2004, 161). The traditional lack 
of a mens rea requirement operated as the ‘doctrinal marker of these defendants less 
than fully criminal status from a social point of view’ (ibid). But regulatory agencies 
have increasingly grown considerable teeth as regards prosecution. The Law Reform 
Commission published a report on corporate killing in 2006 and called for the 
introduction of two new offences: a statutory offence of corporate manslaughter for 
corporate entities; and, a secondary offence (grossly negligent management causing 
death) for corporate officers who play a role in the commission of the offence (see 
also D Aherne, ‘Corporate Killing in Ireland – a new paradigm’ 22 I.L.T. 2004, 235-
239). 
More specifically, section 78 of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act, 2005 
now imposes on conviction on indictment for an offence under the Act a fine not 
exceeding €3 million or imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or both. In 
DPP v O'Flynn Construction Company Limited [2007] 4 IR 500 the Circuit Court 
imposed a fine of €200,000 on O’Flynn Construction Company Limited which 
pleaded guilty to two offences contrary to the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work 
Act, 1989, namely failing to conduct its undertaking in such a way as to ensure so far 
as is reasonably practicable that persons not in its employment who might be affected 
thereby were not exposed to risks to their safety or health, in contravention of s. 7(1) 
of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act, 1989, and failing to signpost and lay 
out so as to be clearly visible and identifiable the surroundings and perimeter of a 
construction site, in contravention of para 18 of the fourth schedule of the Safety, 
Health and Welfare at Work (Construction) Regulations, 1995, in contravention of 
regulation 8(1)(g) of the said Regulations, contrary to s. 48(1)(c) of the Safety, Health 
and Welfare at Work Act, 1989. The incident giving rise to the two charges occurred 
at what was known as Mount Oval Village in Rochestown in Cork. In September 
2001 it was a very large construction development situated on over 100 acres on 
which it was planned that 9 separate housing estates, totalling 850 houses and some 
apartments plus a shopping complex would be built. Boys went into the building site 
and a drum of wood preservative exploded after being set on fire by some of the boys. 
A 9 year old boy died. O’Flynn construction appealed against the severity of the 
penalty. The accused submitted that the fencing of the construction site was, at the 
time, reasonable in all circumstances. The prosecution accepted that the breaches of 
the statutory and regulatory provisions governing safety at the construction site, were 
not a direct cause of the tragic death of the deceased, but were significant contributing 
factors. In dismissing the appeal, Murray CJ noted:  
The most serious lapse on behalf of the applicant company was the delivery 
onto the site of a drum containing hazardous material and leaving it placed in 
the open without securing it against interference by persons such as children or 
teenagers who ventured on to it. In the circumstances the Court is satisfied that 
the learned Circuit Court Judge was perfectly entitled to take a serious view of 
the breach by the company of the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions. 
The breach was aggravated by the fact that it played a significant role in the 
combination of circumstances that led to the fatality…  
Having taken the mitigating circumstances into account the trial judge was 
nonetheless entitled and indeed bound to impose a penalty that reflected the 
seriousness of the offence so that it applied appropriate punitive and deterrent 
elements. Among the elements to be taken into account in assessing the severity of a 
fine, whether imposed on an individual or a corporate entity, is the wealth or 
resources of the person or company concerned. As was found by the learned trial 
judge the defendants in this case are a substantial company who were involved in a 
very substantial construction project. It could not be said to be disproportionate to 
their means and resources. 
 
On conviction on indictment for competition law offences, undertakings are liable to a 
fine not exceeding whichever of the following amounts is the greater, namely €5 
million or ten per cent of the turnover of the undertaking in the financial year ending 
in the 12 months prior to conviction. Individuals are subject to the same fine limits 
and/or a term of imprisonment not exceeding ten years. (See section 8 of the 
Competition Act, 2002 as amended). Section 240 of the Companies Act 1990 (as 
amended by section 104 of Company Law Enforcement Act, 2001) sets out the 
penalties applicable for for company law offences and s. 297 of the Companies Act, 
1963, as amended, s. 242 of the Companies Act, 1990, and s. 114 of the Companies 
Act, 1990 set out the penalties applicable for the commission of offences of fraudulent 
trading, furnishing false information, and insider dealing respectively. 
 
While, McGrath noted in 2012 that “[c]orporate crime is rarely considered to be as 
harmful as ordinary crime” (Irish Criminal Law Journal 2012, 3, 71-79, p72), a series 
of recent cases may indicate an increasing willingness to imprison individuals 
convicted of serious corporate crime (ibid, p75). In late March of 2009, Mr Justice 
McKechnie, in a judgment in the Central Criminal Court which considered 
competition law abuses by an association of Citroen car dealers, noted: ‘These 
[offences] stifle competition and discourage new entrants, damaging economic and 
commercial liberty…[T]hey remove price choice from the consumer, deter consumer 
interest in product purchase and discourage variety. They reduce incentives to 
compete and hamper invention…If previously our society did not frown upon this 
type of conduct, as it did in respect of more conventional crime, that forbearance or 
tolerance has eroded swiftly, as the benefits of competition law become 
clearer…Therefore it must be realised that serious breaches of the code have to attract 
serious punishment [which included imprisonment]’. See DPP v Duffy and Duffy 
Motors (Unreported, Central Criminal Court, 23
rd
 March 2009). See also DPP v 
Manning (Unreported, High Court, 9
th
 February, 2007).  
 
In DPP v. Paul Murray, [2012] IECCA 60, a case concerning social welfare fraud, 
Finnegan J, delivering judgment for the court, emphasized the importance of 
deterrence in sentencing decisions in cases involving revenue fraud. It was suggested  
 
“for the future guidance of sentencing courts that significant and systematic 
frauds directed upon the public revenue - whether illegal tax evasion on the 
one hand or social security fraud on the other - should generally meet with an 
immediate and appreciable custodial sentence”.  
 This judgment proved controversial and in Paul Begley v. DPP [2013] IECCA the 
CCA rejected the contention that cases involving tax evasion should be categorised 
separately from other offences for sentencing purposes and “should not be read as 
suggesting the establishment of any parallel rules on sentencing, relative to such 
crimes or as contemplating any significant adjustment on how courts should value or 
weigh genuine factors in mitigation” [44]. Instead,  
 
“there will be some cases where an immediate sentence is justified and others 
where it will not be. Everything will depend on the crime, the circumstances 
of its commission and the personal situation of the accused. In all cases 
however the ultimate conclusion will be directed by general principles.” [43].  
 
Ultimately, Mr. Begley’s 6 year sentence for offences relating to the fraudulent 
evasion of customs duty was reduced to two years by the CCA as the trial judge had 
failed to properly consider or weigh the mitigating factors in respect of which Mr. 
Begley was entitled to credit.  
 
Another notable high profile case in which a lengthy custodial sentence was imposed 
was that involving former solicitor, Thomas Byrne, who was convicted of 52 offences 
including theft, forgery and using a false instrument and sentenced to 16 years 
imprisonment, with four years suspended. (Irish Times 2
nd
 December 2013). 
However, a custodial sentence was not imposed in the high profile case in 2014 
involving two former Anglo Irish Bank directors, Pat Whelan and Willie McAteer. 
Upon conviction of offences relating to the illegal purchase of Anglo Irish shares 
under section 60 of the Companies Act 1963 the men were sentenced to 240 hours 
community service (Irish Times, July 31
st
, 2014). Judge Nolan decided that “[i]t 
would be most unjust to jail these two men when I feel that a State agency [the 
financial regulator] had led the two men into error and illegality” (Irish Times, April 
30
th
 2014). 
Though all of this constitutes evidence of a drift towards the greater use or threatened 
use of criminal sanctions, it should not be pushed too far. The area of regulatory crime 
still, by and large, remains predominantly orientated towards a compliance model of 
enforcement. This is facilitated by a wide range of strategies that favour the 
employment of negotiation, consultation and persuasion, rather than an exclusively 
sanctioning approach that would potentially polarize the various parties involved. 
These strategies include audits, warning letters, notices, injunctions, guidance, 
binding directions, and the suspension and revocation of licences. The Consumer 
Protection Act, 2007, for example, permits the National Consumer Agency to issue 
prohibition orders to businesses, to take undertakings of compliance, to issue 
compliance notices and fixed payment penalties, in addition to prosecution functions. 
(See A O’Neill, ‘The Consumer Protection Act 2007 – Enforcing the New Rules’ 26 
I.L.T. (2008) 46). In  2007 the National Consumer Agency ‘dealt with thousands of 
complaints…, had contacts with hundreds of retailers over alleged pricing offences, 
but issued only three fixed penalty notices and made sixteen prosecutions’. 
In 2008, the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement (ODCE) issued 24,000 
copies of their publications, closed 850 cases on an administrative basis, made a final 
determination on 280 initial liquidator reports, secured 20 summary convictions, 
secured 20 disqualifications, and one case was successfully prosecuted by the DPP 
following an ODCE investigation. (P Appleby, ‘Compliance and Enforcement – the 
ODCE perspective’ in Kilcommins and Kilkelly, eds, Regulatory Crime in Ireland 
2010, p. 186). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also resolves most issues 
of non-compliance without the need for further enforcement actions. When 
compliance cannot be achieved, administrative and criminal sanctions can be 
employed including notifications of non-compliance In the years 2009-2012, there 
were on average 900 court prosecutions brought each year and 12,000 enforcement 
actions. (EPA, Focus on Environmental Enforcement in Ireland: a report for the 
years 2009-2012, 2014, p. 2) 
Similarly, the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act, 2005 allows the Health and 
Safety Authority to take actions where statutory contraventions are observed or where 
there is a risk of serious personal injury. These actions include: 
 The issuing of an Improvement Direction in relation to activities to which the 
inspector considers may involve risk to safety or health of persons. An employer is 
required to respond with an Improvement Plan. 
 The issuing of an Improvement Notice stating the inspector’s opinion that a 
duty holder has contravened a provision of an Act or Regulation, and requiring that 
the contravention be addressed within a certain time period of not less than 14 days. 
 The issuing of a Prohibition Notice where an inspector is of the opinion that an 
activity is likely to involve a risk of serious personal injury to any person. This notice 
takes effect immediately from when the person, on whom the notice is served, 
receives the notice. 
 The issuing of an Information Notice requiring a person to present to the HSA 
any information specified by the notice. 
 The taking of summary proceedings in the District Court in relation to an 
offence under any of the relevant statutory provisions. 
 The preparation of evidence so that the Director of Public Prosecutions can 
initiate proceedings on indictment for hearing in the Circuit Court. 
 
All of these ensure that prosecutions remain relatively rare, employed as a last resort 
mechanism. As Professor Colin Scott (‘Regulatory Crime: History, Functions, 
Problems, Solutions’ in Kilcommins and Kilkelly, eds, Regulatory Crime in Ireland, 
2010, at 73) has recently noted: 
The enforcement strategies of enforcement agencies have been arrayed in a 
pyramidal approach to enforcement in which the object is to maintain as much 
enforcement activity as possible at the base of the pyramid…This approach is 
said to be effective not only with businesses which are orientated to legal 
compliance, but also with the ‘amoral calculators’ for whom compliance 
becomes the least costly path when they know there is a credible threat of 
escalation to more stringent sanctions.  
2.5.6 HYBRID ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
Finally, another striking feature of this regulatory infrastructure is the proliferation of 
hybrid enforcement mechanisms that can be employed by the agencies or, on 
occasion, by private parties. These mechanisms have also contributed to a more 
general ‘blurring of legal forms’ (A Ashworth, ‘Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause’ 
116 L.Q.R. 2000, 237), conflating the functional distinctions that exist between 
criminal and civil law, and between regulatory wrong-doing and ordinary wrong-
doing. For example, and apart from the possibility of a criminal prosecution by the 
Competition Authority, private parties can seek to initiate civil enforcement of 
competition law under section 14(1) of the Competition Act, 2002. Section 8(10) of 
the same Act provides that an action under section 14 may be brought whether or not 
there has already been a criminal prosecution in relation to the matter concerned and, 
in addition, a section 14 action will not prejudice the initiation of any future 
prosecution. Indeed, the Competition Authority itself can also seek to bring a civil 
action under section 14(2) of the Act (D McFadden, ‘Two Tiers Equals Full Suite: 
Civil Fines Complement Criminal Enforcement’ in Kilcommins and Kilkelly, eds, 
Regulatory Crime in Ireland, 2010, 210). Similarly, the Office of the Director of 
Corporate Enforcement can take civil or criminal enforcement actions. Civil 
enforcement actions include the use of restriction and disqualification orders. 
This fragmentation in responses to a breach of a regulatory offence can give rise to 
difficulties having regard to the principled protections generally afforded to those 
accused of crime. To give one instance, the Revenue may proceed against a tax 
defaulter through the criminal courts under section 1078 of the Taxes Consolidation 
Act, 1997 whilst also exercising its considerable civil powers to collect tax and 
impose civil penalties (fixed penalties and tax geared penalties) under section 1053 of 
the same Act. The latter penalties are available ‘without prejudice to any other penalty 
to which the person may be liable’. This, as Tom O’Malley notes, can pose a 
‘problem for any sentencing system claiming to be guided by proportionality 
standards’ (Sentencing Law and Practice, 1st ed, 2000, 128). 
For example, in the People (DPP) v Redmond [2001] 3 IR 390, the defendant, who 
had previously worked as a senior official in local government in Dublin, had been 
charged with ten counts of failing to make tax returns between 1989 and 1997. The 
prosecution case was that the defendant failed to disclose about £249,000 of income 
during this period. The defendant was found guilty and the trial judge imposed a total 
fine of £7,500 in respect of the ten counts. The Director of Public Prosecutions 
appealed on the basis that this sentence was unduly lenient having regard to the 
gravity of the offences. In determining the proportionality of the punishment, the 
Court of Criminal Appeal noted that the defendant had, since his arrest, settled his 
civil revenue liability by paying a total sum of £782,000 to the Criminal Assets 
Bureau which was acting for the Revenue Commissioners. This figure constituted the 
tax liability owing in relation to the criminal charges and other unspecified liabilities 
including interest and penalties. In order to meet this civil liability, Redmond had to 
sell the family home. The Court of Criminal Appeal noted that this full settlement 
figure was not broken down into various headings including the amount claimed in 
penal interest or revenue penalties. This was regrettable since information of this kind 
was important in determining the appropriate criminal sanction. In refusing to 
increase the criminal penalty, the court noted: 
Since proportionality is a key principle of sentencing, the court would 
endeavour to consider the cumulative sum of penalties in assessing the amount 
of the final one. The revenue penalties may vary, in particular with whether 
default in compliance is negligently or fraudulently caused. Such penalties in 
certain circumstances can exceed three times the difference between the tax 
paid and the tax actually payable. … [T]hese are penalties which will be 
imposed on top of the primary obligation of every tax payer to pay the correct 
amount of tax. Similarly, a penal rate of interest may be applied where income 
tax has not been paid as a result of a fraud or neglect of the tax payer. This, 
too, is in the nature of a penalty. It is plainly not possible for a sentencing 
court in a case such as this to ignore the fact that other penalties, which may 
be much greater in amount than the cumulative sum of the maximum fines for 
these charges, have already been paid. It is therefore most unfortunate that the 
evidence does not extend to a statement, even approximate, to the amount of 
penalties so paid, or the defaults in respect of which they were imposed.  
Similarly, in March 2009, a building contractor, Colm Perry, who evaded €500,000 
tax over eight years was jailed for 20 months by Judge Martin Nolan at Dublin Circuit 
Criminal Court. Prior to sentence he settled €499,998 of unpaid income tax and VAT 
returns with the Revenue Commissioners last week, but had a further €925,000 of 
outstanding interest and penalties accumulated on the failed returns from 1996 to 
2004. Judge Nolan accepted the submission that Perry was ‘a hard working, decent 
man’ but said he had to impose a custodial sentence to reflect the scale of his eight-
year tax evasion. On appeal, Hardiman J, delivering the judgment in the Court of 
Criminal Appeal, allowed the appeal and noted: 
There is no doubt that the financial penalty of the same amount as the tax, in 
round figures half a million euros, is in the nature of a punitive consequence. 
We do not find evidence that the learned trial judge sufficiently considered it 
as such. There was a dispute in argument as to whether the interest was a 
punitive consequence. In our opinion in the present time, interest running at 
the rate of between 9% and 12% is undoubtedly punitive. This is a time when 
people, even with relatively substantial bank deposits, may struggle to achieve 
a quarter or even a smaller fraction of that. It is difficult to think of interest at 
the rate of 9% to 12% being imposed upon one as anything other than at least 
partially a punitive factor. We desire to emphasise the point that of course Mr. 
Perry’s liability to pay interest and taxes is unaffected by the Court’s decision 
in this case.   
More recently in Paul Begley v. DPP [2013] IECCA the court held that the restitution 
programme entered into by the defendant which included the payment of a lump sum 
of circa €219,000 to Revenue in December 2009 with a payment schedule of between  
€24,000 and €33,000 per month thereafter until the outstanding balance is fully 
discharged was a factor to be considered in mitigation. 
  The confusion that can arise between civil, administrative and criminal matters was 
also illustrated in Registrar of Companies v District Judge David Anderson and 
System Partners Limited [2005] 1 IR 21. System Partners Limited was late in filing its 
tax returns for the years 2000 and 2001. As a result, it had to pay a late filing fee of 
€1,200 for the year 2000 and €379 for the year 2001. Ordinarily the fee payable by a 
company if it filed its returns on time was €30. Subsequent to the late filing of the 
returns and the payment of the associated late filing fees, two prosecutions pursuant to 
s. 125 of the Companies Act, 1963, as amended by s. 59 of the Company Law 
Enforcement Act, 2001, were initiated in the District Court against System Partners 
Limited for its failure to file annual returns within the times specified for the calendar 
years 2000 and 2001. Section 125 of the Companies Act, 1963, as amended, provides: 
‘(1) Every company shall, once at least in every year, subject to section 127, make a 
return to the registrar of companies, being its annual return, in the prescribed form. (2) 
If a company fails to comply with this section, the company and -(a) every officer of 
the company who is in default… shall be guilty of an offence. (3) Proceedings in 
relation to an offence under this section may be brought and prosecuted by the 
Registrar of Companies.’ At that hearing, it was drawn to the attention of the trial 
judge, Mr Justice David Anderson, that the company had already filed the returns in 
question, albeit late, and had paid the associated late filing fees which were far in 
excess of what would have been payable if the returns had been lodged on time. 
Applying the principle of double jeopardy, Judge David Anderson struck out the 
summonses because System Partners Limited had already been obliged to pay higher 
fees upon filing the returns late. The Registrar of Companies sought certiorari of the 
decision and submitted that a late filing fee was neither in form nor in substance a 
criminal penalty but rather a civil or administrative sanction, the object of which was 
to encourage the timely filing of annual returns. The late filing fees, it was argued, 
had no relationship with the prosecution and in so far as they were relevant it was 
only to issues of mitigation in respect of any fine to be imposed for the actual offence. 
The principle of double jeopardy was, therefore, not applicable. The High Court 
refused the order on the basis that the offence gave rise to a criminal sanction when 
there was already an administrative sanction in place (late filing return fees), and the 
applicant appealed to the Supreme Court. The appeal was allowed in the Supreme 
Court, where Geoghegan J noted that the issue of double jeopardy did not arise, as the 
imposition of the initial penalty was an administrative rather than criminal matter. The 
payment of the substantially increased fees would, however, be a legitimate matter to 
take into consideration by way of mitigation of penalty if there was a conviction in the 
case. 
The issue of double jeopardy has also been considered by the Financial Regulator’s 
office. It is permitted to impose civil administrative sanctions for ‘prescribed 
contraventions’ of relevant legislation. These sanctions include, inter alia,  a caution 
or reprimand, a monetary penalty (not exceeding €5,000,000 in the case of a corporate 
and unincorporated body, and not exceeding €500,000 in the case of a person), and a 
direction disqualifying a person from being concerned in the the management of a 
regulated financial service provider (s 33AQ and 33AR of the Central Bank Act 
1942). In 2008, for example, Quinn Insurance Limited was required to pay 
€3,250,000 and Mr Sean Quinn (senior) was also required to pay a penalty of 
€200,000). The Financial Regulator also has criminal powers of prosecution and 
enforcement. However, and in response to the problem posed by the principle of 
double jeopardy,  no criminal prosecution will be brought if the Regulator has pursued 
the administrative sanctions procedure which has resulted in the imposition of a 
monetary penalty (N Connery and D Hodnett, Regulatory Crime in Ireland, 2009, 
140-151).   
 
The potential for blurring of the boundaries was also addressed by the Irish Supreme 
Court, In the Matter of Tralee Beef and Lamb Ltd (In Liquidation) Kavanagh v. 
Delaney & ors [2008] I.E.S.C. 1, in which it described a restriction order, which 
prohibits a person from being involved in the management of a company for five 
years, as highly stigmatising and “gravely damaging to the reputation of a person thus 
afflicted.” This would accordingly need to be taken into account in any subsequent 
criminal sentencing decision relating to the same misconduct. Similarly in People 
DPP v Clarkin (10 February 2010, Unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, a trial 
judge, in a criminal fraudulent trading case, took into account the fact that the guilty 
party had also a five year disqualification order imposed on him. Finally, in Re 
Kentford Securities Ltd; DCE v McCann [2010] IESC 59, a discretionary 
disqualification order was held to be ‘partly penal in nature’.   
 
 
